The only description of the 2024 understanding in Chinese is three “positions of principle” that Beijing announced for itself. Read closely, they are terms set by one side. Two years later the Foreign Ministry was summoning the Philippine ambassador over a clash at the same reef.
The reading
What Beijing published is its own position, not the agreement. Asked whether an understanding had been reached, the spokesperson first restated sovereignty, then listed three principles “China has publicly announced”, and only then said that “on the basis of” those principles a provisional arrangement on humanitarian supplies had been reached. No agreed text appears. The Chinese account builds notice and inspection into its second principle; in April 2025 the ministry was answering a Philippine denial that Manila consults China before a mission. Each capital describes the same arrangement by its own terms. E89 E66
The first principle keeps the end goal on the table. The arrangement does not accept the ship. China “still demands” that it be towed away and the reef returned to a state with “no personnel and no facilities”. Resupply is permitted only “before” that happens. The arrangement is framed as a pause in a demand, not a settlement of it. E89
The legal hook is article 5 of the 2002 Declaration. The answer says the grounding violates the Declaration's undertaking not to inhabit uninhabited features. That is the clause Beijing prefers for this reef: it turns a dispute over sovereignty into a breach of an agreed regional rule that Manila itself signed. E89 S45
The third principle identifies what the contest is about. Food and water are allowed; construction materials are not. Wu Shicun has explained why: the hulk is rusting and will collapse unless reinforced. The line between “living supplies” and “building materials” is therefore the line between a ship that lasts and one that does not. E89 T38
The first run under the arrangement is recorded in two sentences. On 27 July 2024 the coast guard said one Philippine civilian boat delivered living supplies, which it “confirmed and supervised throughout”, and hoped Manila would “keep its promise”. By April 2025 the ministry counted seven such rounds. E90 E66
Two years later the register is that of a breach. The summons of 21 July 2026 says two rubber boats from the grounded ship approached and rammed coast guard craft and that Philippine personnel attacked Chinese officers. It calls this provocation followed by a reversal of blame, and ends with a warning that China “will take measures”. The ministry did not say the arrangement was over. In October the two sides gave opposite accounts of the evacuation of an injured man from the ship. E26 E48 E49
How to read the sequence. The arrangement worked while both sides could describe it differently and each resupply stayed small. It has no published text to appeal to when they disagree, so each incident is argued from scratch. The three principles are still Beijing's stated position, which means the demand to remove the ship has never been withdrawn.
The passages
22 July 2024, first principle
中方仍要求菲方拖走该舰,恢复仁爱礁无人无设施的原状。
China still demands that the Philippines tow the ship away and restore Ren'ai Jiao to its original state, with no personnel and no facilities.
Second principle
在事先向中方通报,并经现场核查后,允许菲方实施运补,中方将全过程予以监控。
…after prior notification to China and on-site verification, to allow the Philippines to carry out the resupply, which China will monitor throughout.
Third principle
如果菲方运送大量建材上舰,试图建设固定设施和永久哨所,中方绝不接受
If the Philippines ships large quantities of construction materials to the vessel in an attempt to build fixed facilities and a permanent outpost, China will absolutely not accept it.
22 July 2024
双方同意共同管控海上分歧,推动南海局势降温。
The two sides agreed to manage differences at sea jointly and to work to cool the situation in the South China Sea.
Coast guard spokesperson on the first resupply, 27 July 2024
中国海警对此加以确认并全程监管。
The China Coast Guard confirmed this and supervised it throughout.
Foreign Ministry summons of the Philippine ambassador, 21 July 2026
菲方挑衅在先,反而倒打一耙,歪曲事实,恶意炒作。
The Philippine side provoked first, then turned the accusation around, distorted the facts and maliciously hyped the matter.