Two of China's best-known analysts look at Washington's partners and reach opposite tones. Hu Bo's institute counts their ships and finds them few, short-stay and mostly on port visits. Wu Shicun calls Japan's role “destructive”.
The figures
| Western Pacific, 2025, as the institute counts it | United States | Other outside countries |
|---|---|---|
| Warships | 109 | 48 (from Europe, Oceania and Canada) |
| Ship-days | 9,088 | 610, about two ships on any day |
| Military aircraft sorties | the “great majority” of more than 20,000 | about 1,500 (Australia, Canada, India and others) |
The reading
The count deflates the coalition. The institute's first report on outside countries other than the United States finds that of some 10,000 warship-days in the western Pacific in 2025, the United States accounted for 9,088 and all the others for 610. Hu Bo's reading is that most of these navies cannot sustain high-intensity operations, that four-fifths of what they do is port calls and symbolic drills, and that their first task is diplomacy and “network building”. T5
He sees them drifting from Washington, not following it. Hu lists three motives besides supporting US strategy: showing the flag, cultivating old regional ties (he names Britain, France and the Netherlands and their colonial histories), and “freedom of navigation”. He adds that some of these countries act with independent calculations and even weaken the centrality of US forces. With Washington playing down rules and values, he expects Britain, France, Canada and Australia to make more of them. T5
His advice is aimed at a Chinese audience. “Neither play up the risk of a multinational alliance nor ignore its effect” is a warning against two domestic reflexes. The report still concludes that China is “without doubt” the main target of these deployments. And Hu makes a specific demand of foreign governments: when they announce an “unsafe intercept” by Chinese aircraft, give the coordinates and “the first half of the story”. T5
Wu Shicun on Japan is a different register. Speaking the same winter, Wu says Japan “jumps very high” on the issue. He cites the reciprocal access agreement with Manila in force since September 2025, talks on transferring surface-to-air missiles, and an ammunition depot on Palawan that he places 200 kilometres from Huangyan Dao. He says any US–Philippine military activity that adds a third country adds Japan first. T7
Wu dates America's change of side precisely. For him the turning point is 13 July 2020, when the US Secretary of State issued a statement on the fourth anniversary of the award. Before it Washington was neutral on sovereignty; after it, he says, it backs any claimant that makes trouble for China. He adds that the next administration confirmed the statement and extended the US–Philippine treaty to attacks on Philippine government vessels, and that the second Trump administration has carried the same line into military measures. T7
He also watches Manila's politics. Wu describes mid-term elections in May 2025 that went against the Marcos family, an anti-corruption protest of about 500,000 people in Manila that November, and the possibility of Sara Duterte running in 2028. The implication is left unstated: a different government in Manila once shelved the award, and might again. T7
Two analysts, one question. Hu measures capability and concludes the partners are not a military problem. Wu measures intent and concludes Japan is a political one. Both can be right. The difference is that one writes about ships and the other about alignments, and Chinese readers are offered both.
The passages
Global Times on the institute's report, May 2026, figures for 2025
其中,美国有109艘军舰在西太平洋活动9088个舰日。
Of these, the United States had 109 warships active in the western Pacific for 9,088 ship-days.
On outside countries other than the United States
这些国家共有48艘军舰在西太平洋共计活动610个舰日,平均每天有2艘左右的水面力量存在。
These countries together had 48 warships active in the western Pacific for a total of 610 ship-days, an average surface presence of about two ships a day.
Hu Bo
80%的实际活动都是港口访问和象征性的联演联训
…80% of their actual activity is port visits and symbolic joint exercises and training.
Hu Bo
多数域外国家仅在西太平洋开展临时性军事部署,并不具备长期、高强度作战能力,难以形成实质性重大军事威胁
Most outside countries make only temporary military deployments in the western Pacific; they do not have the capacity for long, high-intensity operations and can hardly pose a substantial major military threat.
Hu Bo
部分国家相关行动甚至显现出脱离美国主导、弱化美军中心地位的趋势
Some countries' actions even show a tendency to move away from US leadership and to weaken the central position of US forces.
Wu Shicun, December 2025
日本对南海事务的介入是非常负面的,甚至是破坏性的。
Japan's involvement in South China Sea affairs is very negative, even destructive.
Wu Shicun, on the Pompeo statement of 13 July 2020
由此开始,美国在南海问题上不再中立,而是选边站
From that point the United States was no longer neutral on the South China Sea issue but took sides.