South China Sea南海

Analysis

Why the Code of Conduct stalls: Wu Shicun's account

The founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, in a 2024 interview.

Official communiqués say only that consultations “continue to advance”. Wu Shicun says what the parties disagree about: whether the code binds, what area it covers, what it does about outsiders, and whether it manages crises or settles disputes.

The reading

The reason for the stall is put on China's own timetable. Wu says that when the talks began, the other parties wanted rules to restrain China's reclamation and its growing forces. Once China had finished building, they turned to enlarging their own features, and their interest in a code fell. It is an unusually direct admission that the negotiation's purpose, as others saw it, was overtaken by the facts China created. T6

He lists the open questions the communiqués never state. Whether the code will be legally binding; whether it must be ratified by legislatures; what area it covers; and what it says about third parties, including whether littoral states may host US military exercises or let outside companies explore for oil and gas. Two years later the Philippine foreign secretary's reported list of unresolved issues was the same: legal force, scope, definitions. T6 S63

On scope, each party wants the code to cover the place where it is weakest on the water. Vietnam wants the Xisha Islands included, which China holds entirely and says are not in dispute. The Philippines wants Huangyan Dao included, which China controls. China wants only the Nansha Islands, where control is divided. Each proposal would constrain someone else's stronghold. T6 S39

Crisis management or dispute settlement. Wu's last distinction explains why a text can be 80% agreed and still not finished. A code that manages incidents can be written without deciding who owns what. A code that settles disputes cannot. On his account Beijing wants the first, and Hanoi and Manila want the second. T6

A caution about the source. This interview was given to an English-language Hong Kong newspaper and is cited here from its Chinese text on a mainland academic site. Wu is the most frank in it of any of his pieces read for this site. His later statements in mainland media are more guarded: in 2026 he said his worry was less that the code would fail than that the Philippines would blame China if it did. T6 T42

The passages

Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.

On why momentum was lost

但现在随着中国完成例如造岛工作,争端各方正考虑扩建各自控制的岛礁或试图巩固对争议海域的控制。这意味着争端各方现在对《准则》谈判的积极性已经降低了。

But now that China has completed work such as island building, the parties to the dispute are considering enlarging the features they each control or trying to consolidate their control of disputed waters. This means the parties' enthusiasm for the code negotiations has now fallen.

On the state of the talks in 2024

虽然工作组层面或高级官员层面的谈判仍在进行,但进展非常缓慢,或者根本没有进展。

Although negotiations at working-group and senior-official level are still going on, progress is very slow, or there is none at all.

On geographic scope

越南希望《准则》涵盖西沙群岛;中国认为《准则》只应涵盖南沙群岛;而菲律宾希望《准则》不仅涵盖南沙群岛,还应涵盖黄岩岛。

Vietnam wants the code to cover the Xisha Islands; China holds that the code should cover only the Nansha Islands; and the Philippines wants the code to cover not only the Nansha Islands but Huangyan Dao as well.

On what the code is for

中国是将《准则》视为一种危机管控机制,而越南和菲律宾等争端当事国则将其视为一种争端解决机制。

China sees the code as a crisis-management mechanism, while parties to the dispute such as Vietnam and the Philippines see it as a dispute-settlement mechanism.

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