South China Sea南海

Chinese-language sources, read in English

Claims and law

What Beijing claims in the South China Sea and the laws it has written to back the claim, taken from the Chinese government's own documents. Positions are reported as Beijing states them; other claimants and the 2016 arbitral tribunal reject central parts of them.

The claim in Beijing's words

Beijing states its claim in a fixed formula. The government statement of 12 July 2016 says China's "territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests" in the South China Sea comprise four things. First, sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao (南海诸岛), made up of the Dongsha (东沙), Xisha (西沙), Zhongsha (中沙) and Nansha (南沙) island groups. Second, internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone based on those islands. Third, an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf based on them. Fourth, "historic rights" (历史性权利) in the South China Sea S14. The Foreign Ministry repeated that sentence word for word on 12 July 2026 S33.

The wording was built up in layers:

  • 1958: the territorial sea declaration listed the four groups as Chinese territory and set a 12-nautical-mile limit S1.
  • 1992: the territorial sea law turned that list into statute S2.
  • 1998: the EEZ law added a one-line saving clause on historic rights without defining them S4.
  • 2009: objecting to Vietnamese and Malaysian continental-shelf submissions, Beijing spoke of "indisputable sovereignty" over the islands "and their adjacent waters", plus sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant seabed S11S12.
  • 2011: a note to the UN, quoted in the 2014 position paper, said the Nansha Islands are entitled to a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf S13.
  • 2016: the statement treats the island groups as units generating zones and lists historic rights separately. It mentions that a map showing the "dashed line" (断续线) was published in 1948, but does not say what the line legally means S14.

Beijing says the claim rests on history. The 2016 white paper asserts that China was the first to discover, name, develop and administer the islands S16.

The 2016 award and Beijing's reply

Beijing never took part in the arbitration brought by the Philippines. Its December 2014 position paper argued three points: the case was in substance about territorial sovereignty, which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not govern; Manila had agreed to settle disputes by negotiation; and any maritime element was part of delimitation, which China excluded from compulsory procedures by a 2006 declaration S13.

When the award came on 12 July 2016, the Foreign Ministry called it "null and void" with "no binding force", and said China "neither accepts nor recognises" it S15. A white paper followed the next day. It dated the dispute to Philippine occupation of Nansha features from the 1970s and restated Deng Xiaoping's formula of "sovereignty is ours, shelve disputes, pursue joint development" S16.

The line has not softened. In July 2025 Wang Yi (王毅) called the tribunal's conduct beyond its powers. He objected in particular to its finding that Taiping Dao (太平岛) is a rock, and said outside countries had orchestrated the case S44. A group of states led by the US and the Philippines marked the tenth anniversary with a joint statement. Beijing answered that the award had become a tool for Philippine claims and a pretext for outside intervention S33. By Beijing's own account, therefore, the tribunal, the Philippines and those states take the opposite view.

Administration

Beijing treats the area as ordinary Hainan territory.

  • 2012: the State Council created the prefecture-level city of Sansha (三沙市), seated on Yongxing Island, to govern the Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha groups "and their waters" S19.
  • 2020: Sansha gained two districts, Xisha District (also administering Zhongsha) and Nansha District, seated on Yongshu Reef S20. One day later two ministries published standard names for further features and undersea entities S21.
  • 2024: a further names notice came out on the day the Huangyan baselines were declared S22.

Diplomacy and the Code of Conduct

Since 2014 Beijing has described its approach as "dual-track" (双轨思路): disputes are for the directly concerned states to negotiate, while peace and stability are maintained jointly by China and ASEAN S47. It cites the 2002 Declaration on Conduct for both tracks. Article 4 refers to negotiation by the sovereign states directly concerned, and article 10 points toward a code of conduct S45. Guidelines for implementing the declaration were agreed in 2011 S46.

Chinese accounts record these steps in the code talks:

  • first reading of a single draft text completed in 2019, with a three-year target S48;
  • second reading completed in July 2023 S49;
  • third reading under way in May 2024 S50 and declared complete by Wang Yi in March 2025 S51;
  • agreement in July 2025 to aim for conclusion within 2026 S52;
  • a consultation roadmap adopted at Cebu in January 2026 S54;
  • Wang Yi's promise in March 2026 of a "golden code" this year S55, and his "window of time" remark in July S58.

Working-group meetings continued to the 59th, in Brunei in October 2026, with communiqués giving no detail S59. At the Manila summit on 16 November 2026, Li Qiang (李强) said only that China "looks forward to" an early code, and none was announced S62. Hong Kong media reported the Philippine foreign secretary as saying the talks were unfinished, with about 80% of the text provisionally agreed and the question of legal force unresolved S63.

The Foreign Ministry's talking points recur:

  • Philippines: accused of "infringement and provocation" at Huangyan Dao and Ren'ai Jiao (仁爱礁) S34S36.
  • Vietnam: told that Xisha is "not in dispute" and that construction on "illegally occupied" Nansha features is opposed S38S39, while boundary officials still meet to "manage differences" S60.
  • United States: freedom of navigation "has never been a problem", and Beijing rejects "navigational hegemony" S33S41S49. US warship transits are described as intrusions S43.
  • Outside countries (域外国家): told to stop "meddling" S41S52S58.

What changed 2023–2026

  • Map: the 2023 standard map drew protests. A reporter's question put it to the ministry that the map shows ten dashes against nine in 2009. The ministry replied only that map publication is routine S23S24S25.
  • Philippine legislation and baselines: Manila's Maritime Zones Act of November 2024 drew a formal statement S32. Two days later came baselines around Huangyan Dao S8S9, deposited with the UN that December S10. That statement classes Huangyan Dao as part of the Zhongsha Islands S32.
  • Nature reserve: in September 2025 the State Council approved a Huangyan Dao National Nature Reserve of 3,523.67 hectares S26S28. Management measures issued on 1 August 2026 bar entry and fishing without approval and give enforcement to the Coast Guard S30. Beijing dismissed Philippine and US objections S29S31.
  • Counter-baselines: when the Philippines drew its own baselines at the shoal, Beijing declared them "illegal and invalid" on 31 July 2026 S35.

Key passages in the original

Short passages from the documents above, in Chinese with an English rendering. Each links to the full Chinese text in the source list.

中国在南海拥有历史性权利

China has historic rights in the South China Sea. S14

Statement on territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, 2016-07-12

该裁决是无效的,没有拘束力,中国不接受、不承认

The award is null and void and has no binding force; China neither accepts nor recognises it. S15

Foreign Ministry statement on the award, 2016-07-12

中国最早发现、命名和开发利用南海诸岛及相关海域

China was the first to discover, name, and develop and use Nanhai Zhudao and the relevant waters. S16

White paper: China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, 2016-07-13

本法的规定不影响中华人民共和国享有的历史性权利

The provisions of this law do not affect the historic rights enjoyed by the PRC. S4

Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, 1998-06-26

外国军用船舶进入中华人民共和国领海,须经中华人民共和国政府批准

Foreign military vessels entering the territorial sea require the Chinese government's approval. S2

Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1992-02-25

采取包括使用武器在内的一切必要措施制止侵害、排除危险

Take all necessary measures, including the use of weapons, to stop the infringement and remove the danger. S5

Coast Guard Law, 2021-01-22

有关争议由直接当事国通过友好协商谈判寻求和平解决

The disputes are to be resolved peacefully by the directly concerned states through friendly consultation and negotiation. S47

Wang Yi: handle the South China Sea issue with a "dual-track approach", 2014-08-09

我们不接受以航行自由为名,行航行霸权之实

We do not accept navigational hegemony in the name of freedom of navigation. S49

Wang Yi sets out China's principled position, 2023-07-15

南海的航行和飞越自由从来不存在任何问题

Freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea has never been a problem. S33

statement on certain countries hyping the tenth anniversary of the award, 2026-07-12

一致同意力争在2026年内完成磋商

Agreed to strive to complete the consultations within 2026. S52

Wang Yi interview after the East Asia foreign ministers' meetings, 2025-07-12

西沙群岛是中国固有领土,不存在任何争议

The Xisha Islands are China's inherent territory; there is no dispute. S39

Vietnam has no right to comment on China's construction in Xisha, 2026-09-03

Compiled on 16 November 2026 from pages opened that day. Law texts were read on Foreign Ministry, Xinhua and government copies; quotations are short and should be checked against the linked original before reuse.