Wu Shicun speaks for no ministry, but his forecasts track what later happens. In December 2025 he predicted the code talks would stall and the contest at Huangyan Dao would go on. He has also said in public what Beijing might do to the grounded ship, and why it has not.
The reading
The forecast for 2026 was made in public and was largely right. In December 2025 Wu wrote that the “stabilising” trend of recent years could partly reverse, that reaching consensus on the code by the end of 2026 would be harder than expected, and that the contest of “rights protection and infringement” at Huangyan Dao would continue. This site's timeline for 2026 records the July clashes, the baseline dispute and a code not concluded at the November summit. T8 E29 S35 S62
He names the sticking points before the diplomats do. His list of unresolved issues in the code talks is geographic scope, the code's relation to the 2002 Declaration, the nature of the mechanism, and third-party interests. He predicts that the Philippines, as ASEAN chair in 2026, would try to write the award into the text, and that some claimants see the code as “a tool to restrain an opponent”. T8
His picture of the US relationship is a standing confrontation, not a crisis. “Low intensity, high frequency” is his phrase for what the two militaries now do in the sea, and he says the risk of an accidental clash from a dangerous encounter is rising. He lists the specifics: unmanned systems supplied to Manila, an unmanned-vessel base, an anti-ship missile launcher on Batan Island by the Bashi Channel, and more than ten “US–Philippines plus” exercises in the year. T8
On the grounded ship he says what officials do not. Asked what China might do if Manila filed a second arbitration, Wu suggests that Beijing could “clear away” the ship at Ren'ai Jiao as a countermeasure, and forcibly expel the vessel then at Xianbin Jiao. He presents this as the cost that should make Manila think twice. No official statement read for this site names such a step. T38
And why it has not been done. His answer to why China does not simply tow the hulk is practical: after twenty-five years it is rusted through, has no power, and might break up under tow; and it has armed soldiers aboard. The explanation makes the construction materials the real issue. If the ship cannot be moved, the contest is over whether it is allowed to be repaired or left to collapse. T38 E111
The stated reason for rebutting the award is its afterlife in other courts. In 2026 Wu writes that the award's conclusions are being cited in other international judgments and are spreading into wider questions of the law of the sea. That is a different worry from the official one. The fear is not that the award will be enforced against China, but that its reasoning on islands and historic rights will become ordinary law. T35
A “fourth no”. Wu describes China's policy as three refusals, not accepting, not participating, not recognising, and says a fourth was later added: not implementing. He maintains that most developing countries understand it. T38
The passages
On China and the United States, December 2025
两国在南海的战略互动更趋近于一种低烈度、高频率但易引发潜在冲突风险的常态化军事对峙
The two countries' strategic interaction in the South China Sea is coming closer to a routine military standoff: low in intensity, high in frequency, and liable to produce the risk of conflict.
December 2025
“南海行为准则”磋商进入胶着状态。
Consultations on the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” have entered a stalemate.
Forecast for 2026
持续数年的“趋稳向好”局面有可能发生一定程度逆转。
The “stabilising and improving” situation that has lasted for several years may to some degree be reversed.
On what might follow a second Philippine arbitration, 2024
比如,中国可能借反制的机会,把仁爱礁它的“坐滩”军舰给“清零”了。
For example, China might take the opportunity of a countermeasure to “clear away” its “grounded” warship at Ren'ai Jiao.
On why the ship has not been removed
我认为从技术上来看是拖不走,没法拖了,自己的动力也没有了,一拖可能就散架了
I think that technically it cannot be towed away. It can no longer be towed; it has no power of its own, and if you tow it, it may fall apart.
On why the award must keep being rebutted, 2026
“裁决”已被一些由国际司法、仲裁机构作出的判决和裁决不当引用
The “award” has already been improperly cited in some judgments and awards made by international judicial and arbitral bodies.