South China Sea南海

Analysis

The quiet track in writing: two joint statements with Hanoi

The maritime paragraphs of the China–Vietnam joint statements of April 2025 and April 2026.

A year apart, Beijing and Hanoi signed almost the same paragraph twice. It promises restraint, names the law of the sea as the standard for a settlement, and is silent on everything the two sides are actually doing at sea.

The reading

The paragraph is a formula, repeated. Set side by side, the maritime passages of 2025 and 2026 share most of their sentences word for word: the “in-depth and candid” exchange, the pledge to take no action that complicates the situation, the two sets of consultations, low-sensitivity cooperation, search and rescue, and the description of the code of conduct. The changes are small. In 2026 the sentence about friendship that opened the 2025 paragraph is gone and the passage sits as the last sub-point of a longer section. E63 E12

“Candid” is the tell. In Chinese diplomatic usage an “in-depth and candid exchange of views” usually signals that the two sides disagreed. Both statements use it, and neither says about what. E63 E12

The standard named for a settlement is the law of the sea. Both statements commit the two governments to a solution consistent with the UN Convention and with an earlier bilateral agreement on basic principles. There is no mention of historic rights, the dashed line, or the Xisha Islands. With Vietnam, Beijing signs a text in which the Convention is the measure of a lasting settlement; in its own statements about its claim, the Convention is one basis among several. E63 S14

The pledge and the practice. Each statement promises no action that would complicate matters. In the same period a Beijing think tank measured more than ten square kilometres of new Vietnamese land in the Nansha Islands, and in September 2026 the Foreign Ministry told Hanoi it had no right to comment on Chinese construction in Xisha. The pledge has not stopped either side building. What it appears to buy is that neither makes the other's building a public quarrel. T24 S39

The channel is the two parties. Both texts invoke “the high-level consensus of the two parties and two countries”. The dispute is handled as a matter between ruling communist parties as well as between states, which the Philippines has no equivalent of. The working machinery is listed in the statement itself: consultations on joint development and on delimitation outside the Gulf of Tonkin, which met again at Vung Tau in June 2026. E12 E19

Even the code of conduct is described identically. “Effective, substantive and consistent with international law” is agreed language. The word that is absent is “binding”. Vietnam and China can sign the same sentence about the code because it leaves open the question Wu Shicun says divides them: whether the code manages crises or settles disputes. E12 T6

A comparison. The joint statement with the Philippines of January 2023 also promised to manage differences and to reopen talks on oil and gas. Within eight months coast guard statements about Ren'ai Jiao had replaced it. Similar words held with Hanoi and not with Manila. The texts do not explain why; the difference lies outside them. E106 E109

The passages

Hanoi, 15 April 2025, point 9

双方同意妥善管控解决分歧,维护中越友好大局。

The two sides agree to manage and resolve differences properly and to safeguard the overall friendship between China and Vietnam.

Beijing, 17 April 2026

双方就海上问题深入坦诚交换意见,强调应当更好管控和积极解决海上分歧,共同维护南海和平稳定。

The two sides had an in-depth and candid exchange of views on maritime issues and stressed that maritime differences should be better managed and actively resolved, so as to jointly maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

2026; the same words appear in 2025

不采取使局势复杂化、争议扩大化的行动,共同维护海上稳定。

…to take no action that would complicate the situation or widen the disputes, and jointly to maintain stability at sea.

2025

符合《关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议》和《联合国海洋法公约》等国际法的基本和长久解决办法

…a fundamental and lasting solution consistent with the Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-related Issues between China and Vietnam and with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

2026

推动海上共同开发合作磋商和北部湾湾口外海域划界磋商,早日取得实质进展。

…to advance the consultations on cooperation for joint development at sea and the consultations on delimiting the waters outside the mouth of the Beibu Gulf, so as to achieve substantive progress at an early date.

2026; the same words appear in 2025

在协商一致基础上早日达成有效、富有实质内容、符合包括《联合国海洋法公约》在内国际法的“南海行为准则”。

…to reach at an early date, on the basis of consensus, a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that is effective, substantive and consistent with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

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