South China Sea南海

Analysis

The “grey zone”, turned around

Hu Bo's November 2024 paper on grey-zone competition against China, and a 2025 journal article on America's partners.

“Grey zone” is the label Washington and Manila apply to China's coast guard and fishing fleets. Chinese analysts accept the concept and reverse the direction: on their account it is Vietnam's militia, Manila's publicity and America's coast guard that operate below the threshold of war.

The reading

The concept is accepted; the accused is changed. Hu Bo does not reject “grey zone” as a foreign invention. He treats it as a real mode of competition and catalogues who practises it against China. The effect is to take a term designed to describe Chinese behaviour and fill it with other people's. T25

Non-military forces: Vietnam first. His first category is the use of coast guards, law-enforcement fleets and fishing boats. Vietnam is the main example: a militia of at least 8,000 boats which, he writes, carries machine guns and cannon and has attacked foreign enforcement officers with home-made explosives. He adds a Philippine plan for a militia unit, Indonesian proposals to enlist fishermen, US coast guard deployments since 2019 and, from 2020, reconnaissance aircraft flown by American private contractors near China's coast. T25

Publicity is counted as a weapon. His second category is narrative competition, which he calls a form of cognitive warfare. He describes the Philippine practice of filming and publishing every encounter, names it by the term its authors use, “assertive transparency”, and says US reconnaissance aircraft supply footage. He cites an American university project on Chinese maritime activity that he says is funded by the US Navy's research office. On this view a press release is an operation. T25

He concedes why the method works. The space for narrative competition, he writes, comes from “gaps and vagueness in the rules of conduct at sea”, and the law of the sea itself is “full of ambiguity and argument”. That is close to what a Chinese jurist says of China's own terms. If the rules are vague, the side that explains itself best wins the argument, and Hu is describing a contest China has been losing. T25 T15

The journal article adds the alliance dimension. Han and Jin argue that the United States competes in the grey zone through its partners: building and spreading the story, giving support short of military intervention, joining freedom of navigation operations, hosting forward deployments. They call it “double coordination” and list the partners' motives, including keeping the US relationship, pursuing their own claims, and economic gain. They also list what limits it: partners see China differently and disagree on strategy. T37

What is absent. In the passages read here neither text applies the term to China's own coast guard, fishing fleets or militia. Hu's remark that using coast guards instead of navies is “a consensus of restraint” is the nearest thing to a description of China's conduct, and it presents that conduct as moderation. The symmetry the authors draw for others is not drawn for China. T25

Why it matters for reading America's position. These texts show how Chinese analysts understand US strategy in the sea: not as preparation for war but as a long contest of presence, law and publicity conducted largely through others. That reading explains why Chinese responses now come with their own video, their own reports and their own “new narrative”.

The passages

Hu Bo, on the use of non-traditional forces

海岸警卫队而非海军是各种海上摩擦和对抗的主要和直接的参与方

Coast guards, not navies, are the main and direct participants in the various frictions and confrontations at sea.

Hu Bo

最保守的估计,越南约8000艘渔船和1.22%的海上劳动力属于海上民兵力量。

On the most conservative estimate, about 8,000 Vietnamese fishing boats and 1.22% of its maritime workforce belong to the maritime militia.

Hu Bo

从2019年开始,美国每年都以对抗中国“灰色地带”竞争的名义派遣海岸警卫队舰艇在南海执行任务。

Since 2019 the United States has every year sent coast guard cutters on missions in the South China Sea in the name of countering China's “grey-zone” competition.

Hu Bo

海上行为规则的空白或模糊给相关方提供了叙事竞争和认知战的巨大空间。

The gaps and vagueness in the rules of conduct at sea give the parties enormous room for narrative competition and cognitive warfare.

Hu Bo

菲美高度重视媒体舆论炒作,每次仁爱礁补给,事前搞吹风,事中频频更新动态,事后发布会各种文本、视频和音频资料全面轰炸。

The Philippines and the United States attach great importance to media publicity: for every Ren'ai Jiao resupply there are briefings beforehand, frequent updates during it, and afterwards a full bombardment of press conferences, texts, video and audio.

Han Haojie and Jin Xin, abstract

这种协同是一种“双重协同”,既包括美国与其盟伴的协同,也包括美国盟伴之间的协同。

This coordination is a “double coordination”: it includes coordination between the United States and its allies and partners, and coordination among those allies and partners themselves.

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