The claim itself is repeated word for word. What changed is everything around it: the offer of joint development and the line about respecting freedom of navigation are gone, and an accusation against the United States has taken their place.
The reading
The claim has not moved. The four elements of 2016 — sovereignty over the island groups, the inner zones, the outer zones, and historic rights — are restated in 2026 in the same words, compressed from four sub-points into one sentence. Whatever else has changed in ten years, the legal formula is treated as fixed text. S14 S33
The history has been pushed back and hardened. In 2016 the statement spoke of “more than 2,000 years” of Chinese activity. In 2026 it dates Chinese navigation to “the Western Han in the second century BC” and adds a sentence that was not there before: that the islands' belonging to China “has long been the general consensus of the international community”. The 2016 text argued a case; the 2026 text asserts that the case is already accepted. S14 S33
Two conciliatory passages have disappeared. The 2016 statement ended with an offer and a reassurance: provisional arrangements “including joint development”, and respect for other states' freedom of navigation and overflight. Neither sentence appears in 2026. Joint development is not mentioned at all. Freedom of navigation survives only as a denial that there is any problem. S14 S33
The map is no longer mentioned. The 2016 statement recalled that the government drew a map “marked with the dashed line” and published it in February 1948. The 2026 statement does not refer to the line or the map. The claim is now stated entirely through islands, zones and historic rights. S14 S33
The adversary is named. The 2016 government statement named no country at all, speaking only of “some countries”. The 2026 statement lists fourteen states by name in its first sentence, then singles out the United States as “the main challenge”. It also describes China's own conduct as “reasonable and lawful, professional and restrained”, the register Chinese officials now use for their forces at sea. S33
A debating point has become official text. In July 2025 Wang Yi asked whether the United States and Japan would give up claims from their own islands if the tribunal's standard applied. A year later the same rhetorical question is written into a formal ministry statement. It is the one place where Beijing argues against the award on its merits instead of its jurisdiction. S44 S33
What this shows. Read side by side, the two texts mark a shift from a claimant explaining itself after a legal defeat to a claimant that treats the legal question as closed and the problem as other states' behaviour. The shift is in tone and in what is offered, not in what is claimed.
The passages
Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.
2016, point 3: the four-part claim
(一)中国对南海诸岛,包括东沙群岛、西沙群岛、中沙群岛和南沙群岛拥有主权;(二)中国南海诸岛拥有内水、领海和毗连区;(三)中国南海诸岛拥有专属经济区和大陆架;(四)中国在南海拥有历史性权利。
China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands; Nanhai Zhudao have internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone; Nanhai Zhudao have an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; China has historic rights in the South China Sea.
2016, point 4: an offer
中国愿同有关直接当事国尽一切努力作出实际性的临时安排,包括在相关海域进行共同开发,实现互利共赢
China is willing to make every effort with the states directly concerned to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, including joint development in the relevant waters, for mutual benefit.
2016, point 5
中国尊重和支持各国依据国际法在南海享有的航行和飞越自由
China respects and supports the freedom of navigation and overflight that all states enjoy in the South China Sea under international law.
2026, point 2
南海是世界上最安全的海上通道之一,南海的航行和飞越自由从来不存在任何问题。
The South China Sea is one of the safest sea lanes in the world; freedom of navigation and overflight there has never been a problem.
2026, point 2
美国等域外国家持续在南海强化军力部署,横冲直撞、煽风点火,此种军事化、胁迫性行径才是当前南海局势面临的主要挑战。
The United States and other countries outside the region keep building up their forces in the South China Sea, charging about and fanning the flames; this militarised, coercive conduct is the main challenge the South China Sea faces today.
2026, point 4
所谓“裁决”是一张非法无效没有拘束力的废纸。
The so-called “award” is a piece of waste paper: illegal, void and without binding force.
2026, point 5
试问,个别支持“裁决”的国家是否已自愿放弃本国相应岛礁的海洋权益?
One may ask: have the few countries that support the “award” voluntarily given up the maritime entitlements of their own comparable islands and reefs?