South China Sea南海

Analysis

The think tanks' rebuttal of the award, and how one argument reached the Foreign Ministry

The 2024 report by the Huayang Center, the National Institute for South China Sea Studies and the Chinese Society of International Law, and a ministry institute's report of July 2026.

The government says the award is void and stops there. The think tanks argue the substance: that historic rights survive the Convention, that the Nansha Islands are a single archipelago in law, and that a tribunal with no Asian member could not judge an Asian dispute. One of their arguments appeared in a Foreign Ministry statement three weeks after a ministry institute published it.

The reading

A division of labour. Official statements argue only that the tribunal had no jurisdiction. This report, issued by two think tanks and the national society of international lawyers, takes on what the tribunal decided: its longest chapter is on the tribunal's findings. It lets Beijing contest the merits without appearing to accept that the merits were properly before anyone. T2 S15

On historic rights, the argument is that the Convention is incomplete. The tribunal held that the Convention superseded earlier historic rights to resources. The report answers that the Convention's own preamble leaves unregulated matters to general international law, that several of its articles treat historic rights with respect, and that such rights “can coexist” with the exclusive economic zone. What it does not do is say what China's historic rights are. It objects to the tribunal's description of them as exclusive rights to resources inside the nine-dash line, and offers no description of its own. T2

On the islands, the argument is custom. The tribunal assessed features one by one. The report says a continental state may treat an outlying archipelago as a unit, that this is long-established customary law the Convention left untouched, and that 17 of about 20 such states do so. It cites as recognition the 1958 note from Vietnam's premier. This is the legal theory behind the phrase “Nanhai Zhudao have an exclusive economic zone”. If accepted it would allow baselines around the whole Nansha group; the report stops short of saying so. T2 S14

On the tribunal, the argument is cultural. Four arbitrators were European and the fifth, from Ghana, is said to have lived long in Europe. The report concludes that the panel lacked “awareness of Asian civilisation, diplomacy and legal tradition”. This is an argument about legitimacy, not law: it does not say which finding a differently composed panel would have made otherwise. T2

An argument travelling from institute to ministry. The 2024 report states that Philippine territory is limited by treaties and names them: the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the 1900 Treaty of Washington and the 1930 treaty on the boundary with British North Borneo. On 8 July 2026 the Ministry of Natural Resources' strategy institute published a report built on the same “international treaty limits”. On 31 July the Foreign Ministry's statement on Huangyan Dao said Philippine territory “has been fixed by a series of international treaties” that never included the shoal. The official text carries the conclusion; the think-tank texts carry the treaties. T2 T12 S35

A proposal worth noticing. The report records that China has proposed “preventive measures for managing maritime risks” to operate before any code of conduct is concluded, and says ASEAN states broadly agree. With the code missed again in November 2026, this interim idea is the nearest thing in the Chinese texts to a plan for what happens meanwhile. T2 S62

What the rebuttal concedes by its form. Eight years after the award, the report begins by saying its negative effect on the disputes, on bilateral relations and on the code talks “is increasingly apparent”. A ruling that was truly waste paper would not need another long rebuttal eight years on, and a further one in 2026.

The passages

Part 3(1), on historic rights

《公约》虽然表达了“解决与海洋法有关的一切问题的愿望”,但没有也不可能穷尽解决一切海洋法问题,不能取代中国依据一般国际法在南海享有的历史性权利。

Although the Convention expresses “the desire to settle all issues relating to the law of the sea”, it did not and could not exhaustively settle every such issue, and it cannot replace the historic rights China enjoys in the South China Sea under general international law.

Part 3(1)

中国的历史性权利与专属经济区和大陆架的权利可以共存。

China's historic rights and the rights of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf can coexist.

Part 3(2), on treating the Nansha Islands as a unit

事实上,目前世界上拥有远海群岛的约20个大陆国家中,有17个以其远海群岛整体主张海洋权益。

In fact, of the roughly 20 continental states in the world that possess outlying archipelagos, 17 claim maritime entitlements for those archipelagos as a whole.

Part 4, on the tribunal's composition

南海仲裁案中,五名仲裁员分别来自德国、波兰、法国、荷兰和加纳,无一人来自亚洲国家。

In the South China Sea arbitration the five arbitrators came from Germany, Poland, France, the Netherlands and Ghana; not one was from an Asian country.

Part 5, China's position

为在“准则”最终达成前妥善管控海上风险,中国提议探讨制定“海上风险管控预防性措施”,并得到东盟国家的普遍认同。

To manage risks at sea properly before the code is finally concluded, China has proposed exploring “preventive measures for managing maritime risks”, which has met with general agreement from the ASEAN states.

Ministry of Natural Resources strategy institute report, as reported 8 July 2026

菲律宾陆地领土边界在西班牙和美国殖民时期逐渐形成,经由三个国际条约在国际法上得到确立,即“国际条约界限”。

The boundaries of the Philippines' land territory took shape gradually in the Spanish and American colonial periods and were established in international law by three international treaties: the “international treaty limits”.

← Why the Code of Conduct stalls: Wu Shicun's account What the dashed line means: three Chinese answers →