South China Sea南海

Analysis

The official script on Washington, and where Chinese analysts depart from it

Foreign Ministry statements of 2024 and 2026 set against Wu Shicun, Zhu Feng, Hu Bo and two university authors.

Officially the United States is an “outside country” fanning the flames. Chinese analysts agree it is the main adversary but disagree with each other about whether it is retreating, what it will risk, and whether its allies really move in step.

The reading

The official script has three fixed parts. First, the United States is not a party: it is an “outside country” (域外国家), and the region's affairs are for China and ASEAN. Second, it is the instigator: neighbours act “secure in that backing”. Third, its groupings are illegitimate “small circles” that import bloc confrontation. The 2026 anniversary statement adds a fourth, naming US “militarised, coercive conduct” as the main challenge the sea faces. In none of these texts does Washington have an interest of its own in the sea; it only meddles. S41 S33

Wu Shicun keeps the script and rejects the comfort. The interview with the most quoted Chinese voice on the sea is introduced by its publisher as showing the United States to be the biggest “black hand” behind the award. But asked whether America is pulling back to its own hemisphere, he calls that reading “naive”: the turn is tactical, forced by a share of world output that he says has fallen from 45% at its peak to about 25%. His America is weaker and no less ambitious. T42

Zhu Feng expects pressure without war. Writing three months into the second Trump term, he predicts more military deterrence, sanctions, narrative campaigns and encouragement of neighbours, and no cut in US military or diplomatic investment. He then adds what official texts do not: that avoiding direct conflict with China is “equally a priority” for Washington, citing senior US officials' own confirmation hearings. His advice is correspondingly mixed: keep up deterrence, and work on ASEAN economically. T16

The “grey zone” charge is returned to sender. Han Haojie and Jin Xin argue that the United States, while accusing China of grey-zone tactics, itself competes below the threshold of war through its allies: shaping the story, lending support short of force, joining freedom of navigation operations, hosting forward deployments. They call this “double coordination”, between America and its partners and among the partners. Notably, they also list its limits: partners see China differently and disagree on strategy. T37

Hu Bo treats coast guards as restraint. His observation that East Asian states have reached “a consensus of restraint” by using coast guards and not navies recasts the whole contest. On this view the water cannon at Huangyan Dao is the low-violence option, and US calls to treat coast guard action as armed attack would raise the stakes. His delegation's line at a conference in Vietnam states the corollary: water cannon is restraint, “but restraint is not unlimited”. T25 T26

Where they agree, and what none of them says. All of these authors treat US alliance-building around the Philippines as the central problem and none expects a negotiated American withdrawal. None discusses, in the texts read here, what the other claimants want from the United States, or whether China's own conduct is what brings Washington in. Hu Bo comes closest, in dating the rivalry's first phase to reactions on both sides to Manila and Hanoi. T30

The gap in one line. Official Beijing describes an arsonist. Its analysts describe a declining, distracted and still dominant power that prefers to avoid a fight, works through others, and may blunder into one. Policy made on the second picture would look different from rhetoric made on the first.

The passages

Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, 12 April 2024, on the US–Japan–Philippines summit

部分国家拉域外国家撑腰壮胆,有恃无恐,不断在海上采取侵权挑衅举动,引发局势升温。个别域外国家煽风点火、挑动对抗,令人愤慨。

Some countries have pulled in outside countries to back them and embolden them and, secure in that backing, keep making infringing and provocative moves at sea, raising the temperature. Certain outside countries fan the flames and stir up confrontation, which is outrageous.

The same press conference

坚决反对在本地区搞封闭排他的“小圈子”

…firmly opposes the creation of closed and exclusive “small circles” in this region.

Wu Shicun, interview with Guancha, August 2026

我的基本判断是,美国维持全球霸主地位的战略和野心永远不会变。聚焦西半球,只是特定阶段的策略调整而已。

My basic judgement is that America's strategy and ambition of keeping its position as global hegemon will never change. Focusing on the western hemisphere is only a tactical adjustment for a particular period.

Zhu Feng, May 2025

尽管特朗普对华政策的强硬态势不减,但避免与中国直接冲突和对抗同样是美国政府的优先选项。

Although the hard line of Trump's China policy has not eased, avoiding direct conflict and confrontation with China is equally a priority for the US government.

Han Haojie and Jin Xin, Pacific Journal, 2025, abstract

美国一方面指责中国对海洋秩序的“灰色地带挑战”,另一方面对华实施海上“灰色地带”竞争。

The United States on the one hand accuses China of a “grey-zone challenge” to the maritime order, and on the other conducts maritime “grey-zone” competition against China.

Hu Bo, November 2024

在东亚,避免直接出动军队似乎成为了一种克制的共识。

In East Asia, avoiding the direct use of the armed forces seems to have become a consensus of restraint.

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