The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties is short, non-binding and still the only text all the claimants have signed with China. Almost every accusation in the dispute is phrased as a breach of one of its clauses.
The reading
Point 4 is Beijing's case against the arbitration. The clause says disputes are to be resolved “by sovereign states directly concerned” through consultation and negotiation. Beijing reads this as a commitment by the Philippines not to go to a tribunal, and has repeated the point in 2016, 2025 and 2026. The same clause, however, cites the 1982 Convention, whose dispute procedures the Philippines used. The sentence can be quoted by either side, which is why it has been. S45 S15 S44
Point 5 is the clause everyone accuses everyone else of breaking. It pledges restraint and, specifically, no new habitation of uninhabited features. Chinese statements treat Philippine landings at Tiexian Jiao and the long stay of a Philippine ship at Xianbin Jiao as violations of this spirit; Wu Shicun applies it to Vietnam's reclamation, which he calls a breach of the Declaration. The clause says nothing about building on features already occupied, which is what China did from 2013 and what Vietnam is doing now. S45 E17 E94 T6
Point 3 is where Beijing agrees with Washington on paper. China signed a commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Its dispute with the United States is about what that freedom includes: Beijing's 1992 law requires warships to obtain approval to enter the territorial sea, and Wang Yi distinguishes freedom of navigation from “navigational hegemony”. S45 S2 S49
Point 10 explains twenty-four years of slow progress. The code of conduct is to be reached “on the basis of consensus”, and the parties agree only to “work towards” it. There is no deadline, no fallback and no majority rule. Any one of eleven governments can hold the text. The readings of 2019, 2023 and 2025 and the missed 2026 target are what that clause looks like in practice. S45 S48 S51 S62
The verbs are political, not legal. The parties “undertake”, “reaffirm” and “agree to work”; nothing in the text creates an obligation that could be enforced, and no body is given the task of deciding whether it has been kept. Whether the future code will be binding is, on the Philippine foreign secretary's account as reported in Hong Kong, still the unresolved question in November 2026. S45 S63
What is not in it. The Declaration contains no definition of the area it covers, no mention of the dashed line, baselines, coast guards or militia, and nothing about construction on occupied features. The matters over which ships now collide are the ones the 2002 text left out.
The passages
Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.
Point 4
有关各方承诺根据公认的国际法原则,包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》,由直接有关的主权国家通过友好磋商和谈判,以和平方式解决它们的领土和管辖权争议,而不诉诸武力或以武力相威胁。
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Point 5
各方承诺保持自我克制,不采取使争议复杂化、扩大化和影响和平与稳定的行动,包括不在现无人居住的岛、礁、滩、沙或其它自然构造上采取居住的行动
The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, including refraining from action of inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays and other features.
Point 3
各方重申尊重并承诺,包括1982年《联合国海洋法公约》在内的公认的国际法原则所规定的在南海的航行及飞越自由。
The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Point 10
有关各方重申制定南海行为准则将进一步促进本地区和平与稳定,并同意在各方协商一致的基础上,朝最终达成该目标而努力。
The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.