South China Sea南海

Analysis

What the dashed line means: three Chinese answers

Wu Shicun, Fu Kuen-chen and Jin Yongming, in their own words.

The government has never said what the line on its maps means. Three prominent Chinese jurists have, and they do not agree: rights within it, a boundary still to be negotiated, or a line that only says which islands are China's.

The reading

Wu Shicun: islands plus historic rights, and no further definition. For Wu the meaning is “very clear”: sovereignty over the features inside the line and historic rights in the waters inside it. It is not a territorial sea limit, and China does not seek to make the sea a “Chinese lake”. His defence is temporal: a line drawn in 1947 cannot be judged by a treaty in force from 1994. He adds that asking China to redefine the line is “unrealistic”, and reads American pressure to clarify it as an attempt to force Beijing's hand. H16 H17

Fu Kuen-chen: a boundary, not yet finished. Fu starts from the map itself. The line was drawn with the symbol Chinese cartographers used for an undetermined land boundary, “solemn and dignified”. He calls it the outer limit of China's “historic waters” and a national maritime boundary still to be completed through bilateral negotiation with neighbours. This is the widest reading on offer, and also the only one that makes the line negotiable by design. He proposes calling it the “U-shaped line”, the name Taipei uses. H17 H32

Jin Yongming: which islands, and whose resources. Jin rejects the historic-waters and boundary readings and proposes a narrower one: the line attributes the islands to China and marks jurisdiction over resources. He divides the enclosed waters into those governed by the ordinary law of the sea and “special waters” under historic rights. In 2012 he recommended that China declare baselines in the Nansha Islands; in 2025 he was still noting that it has not, and why. H13 T15

They disagree about the same map. On Fu's reading the neighbours' waters inside the line are China's unless bargained away. On Jin's they are ordinary maritime zones in which China has some resource rights. On Wu's the question is deliberately left where it is. A neighbour reading all three could not tell which is Chinese policy, and the government has endorsed none. H17 H13 H16

An origin story that undercuts the widest reading. Jin writes that the 1940s government, facing a wave of sweeping maritime claims after the Truman Proclamation, took a “comparatively moderate” course and drew the line by a median-line method to separate China's interests from its neighbours'. A line drawn as a median between coasts is hard to reconcile with a claim to everything inside it as historic waters. H13

Where the government stands now. The 2016 statement mentioned the line once, as a feature of a 1947 map. The 2026 statement does not mention it at all. Official usage has moved toward the vocabulary Jin prefers, islands and zones and historic rights, while declining to adopt his definitions. The scholars' debate is the only place where the line's meaning is argued in Chinese in public. S14 S33

The passages

Wu Shicun

九段线的产生先于1994年生效的《公约》至少40多年,而要求前者符合后者,甚至企图用后者否定前者,则违背了法不溯及既往的国际法基本原则

The nine-dash line came into being at least forty-odd years before the Convention entered into force in 1994; to demand that the former conform to the latter, or even to try to use the latter to negate the former, violates the basic international law principle that law is not retroactive.

Wu Shicun

中国对线内岛礁、沙洲享有主权,且对线内海域拥有历史性权利。

China has sovereignty over the islands, reefs and sandbanks within the line, and has historic rights in the waters within the line.

Wu Shicun

指望中方重新界定九段线的法律释义也看似不现实

…and to expect China to redefine the legal meaning of the nine-dash line also seems unrealistic.

Fu Kuen-chen

它还是中国南海“历史性水域”的外部界限,仍是一条尚未最终确定的国家海洋疆界线。

It is also the outer limit of China's “historic waters” in the South China Sea, and remains a national maritime boundary line that has not yet been finally determined.

Jin Yongming, 2012

中国南海断续线的性质应为岛屿归属及资源管辖线

The nature of China's dashed line in the South China Sea should be that of a line of island attribution and resource jurisdiction.

Jin Yongming, on the 1940s

中国政府采取了比较温和的政策,公布了以“中间线”方式划定的U形线

The Chinese Government adopted a comparatively moderate policy and published a U-shaped line drawn by the “median line” method.

Wu Shicun

中国从未将整个南海视为本国的领海

China has never regarded the whole of the South China Sea as its territorial sea.

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