South China Sea南海

Analysis

“Both sides are exaggerating”: Hu Bo on why China and America are at odds

Two articles by the Peking University scholar who runs China's best-known tracker of US forces.

Hu Bo's account is the least like official language of any Chinese text read for this site. He says Washington is not the root of the disputes, that each side overrates the other's intentions, and that the real quarrel over US military activity is about security, not rules.

The reading

Three causes, in sequence. Hu Bo rejects single explanations. From 2009 to 2012, he argues, friction came mainly from third parties: both capitals were reacting to what the Philippines and Vietnam did. From 2013 to 2016 the argument was about maritime rules, sharpened by island construction and the arbitration. Only from 2017 did plain power competition become the main driver, and he expects it to stay so. The United States enters the story late and by degrees. T30

He contradicts the “black hand” line in so many words. Official statements and commentators such as Wu Shicun describe Washington as the hand behind Manila. Hu Bo writes that although that idea was already popular in China, the United States “was not the source of these crises and frictions”: it wanted to use the disputes for its strategy but also feared losing control, and declined to say how its treaty with Manila applied at Huangyan Dao in 2012. T30 T42

He says China misread America, and America China. Until 2014, on his account, Beijing did not see Washington as its main opponent at sea at all, which is why the American reaction to island building in 2015 came as a surprise. His summary judgement, that both governments “are exaggerating the other's capabilities and intentions”, is not a sentence found in any official Chinese text. T30

The freedom-of-navigation claim is stated with its limits. Where the Foreign Ministry says freedom of navigation “has never been a problem”, Hu Bo is exact about where: outside twelve miles of the Chinese-held Nansha features and outside the territorial sea and internal waters of Xisha. Inside those lines the statement does not apply. He adds that officials of the United States, Britain and Australia confirmed this to him, and records their reply: that China's not doing so now does not mean it will not later. T30 S33

The quarrel over US reconnaissance is recast as one of security. In his 2021 paper on crisis management he argues that the two navies' dispute over military activity in the exclusive economic zone only looks like a dispute about the law of the sea. The fact beneath it is asymmetry: US forces are constantly off China's coast, Chinese forces rarely off Guam or Hawaii. He proposes a negotiated “negative list” of operations each side would refrain from in the other's zone, a practical bargain in place of a legal argument neither side will concede. T31

He also faults the existing safeguards. The 2014 agreements on notification of major military activities and on safe conduct in air and sea encounters, he writes, depend on a good political climate and are weak in compulsion and practicality; they have not noticeably restrained friction. The paper warns that unmanned and intelligent weapons will lower the threshold for the use of force. Five years later his own institute reports that drones fly three in ten US reconnaissance sorties. T31 T3

Why this matters. These are the views of the director of the institute whose annual counts Chinese state media quote. They show that the most data-driven Chinese analysis of the United States is also the least accusatory, and that a serious Chinese proposal for managing the rivalry exists in print.

The passages

Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.

Abstract

第三方因素、海洋规则分歧和权力竞争分别是2009—2012年、2013—2016年、2017—2020年这三个时段最有力的解释变量。

Third-party factors, disagreement over maritime rules, and power competition are the strongest explanatory variables for the three periods 2009–2012, 2013–2016 and 2017–2020 respectively.

Introduction

公允地说,中美都在夸大对方在南海地区的能力和意图,目前如此严重的僵局也超出了双方的最初想象。

In fairness, China and the United States are both exaggerating the other's capabilities and intentions in the South China Sea, and a stalemate as serious as the present one is more than either side first imagined.

Introduction

至少在2014年之前,中国从未把美国作为南海地区的主要对手,当时主要是想阻止美国介入南海争议,这就是为何在2015年初中国无法理解美国对南海岛礁建设的强烈反应。

At least until 2014 China never regarded the United States as its main adversary in the South China Sea; its main aim then was to keep the United States out of the disputes, which is why in early 2015 China could not understand the strength of the American reaction to its island construction.

On 2009–2012

尽管此时"美国是幕后老板"的说法已经在中国流行起来,但美国并不是这些危机和摩擦的根源。

Although the idea that “the United States is the boss behind the scenes” had by then become popular in China, the United States was not the source of these crises and frictions.

Conclusion

在断续线内,在中方控守的南沙岛礁12海里及西沙领海、内水以外的海域,中方从未干涉过任何国家的商业和军事航行自由。

Within the dashed line, in waters outside twelve nautical miles of the Nansha features China holds and outside the territorial sea and internal waters of Xisha, China has never interfered with the commercial or military freedom of navigation of any country.

On military activity in the exclusive economic zone

美军在中国专属经济区有常态化的强大存在,而中国军队仅偶尔在关岛和夏威夷的专属经济区活动,双方存在严重的战略不对等。因此,表面上这是个规则问题,实际上是个战略与安全问题。

US forces have a routine and powerful presence in China's exclusive economic zone, while Chinese forces operate only occasionally in the exclusive economic zones of Guam and Hawaii; there is a serious strategic asymmetry between the two. So on the surface this is a question of rules, but in reality it is a question of strategy and security.

Proposal

双方通过对话和交流,就在他国专属经济区内的具体行动形成一个负面清单,即哪些军事行动是不允许的。

…through dialogue and exchange, the two sides draw up a negative list of specific actions in another state's exclusive economic zone, that is, which military operations are not permitted.

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