The best-known Chinese tracker of US forces does not describe a superpower closing in. It describes one whose carriers are being pulled to the Middle East, whose high-profile operations are falling, and whose presence is being kept up by drones, allies and Philippine bases.
The figures
| What the report counts for 2025 | Figure | How the report reads it |
|---|---|---|
| Large reconnaissance aircraft sorties | about 1,200 | Up on 2024; the increase comes from drones and Philippine bases. The report says its flight-tracking data captures about 70% of actual sorties |
| Share flown by large drones | 30% | MQ-4C and MQ-9 drones from Okinawa and Clark are “the main contributors” to the increase |
| Sorties flown from the Philippines | about 450 (38%) | Clark is closer to the flashpoints than Kadena in Okinawa |
| Carrier strike group entries | 9, by 4 groups | 2024: 8 entries by 3 groups. Three of the four groups were pulled away to the Middle East during the year |
| Nuclear submarines seen in and around the sea | at least 11 | “Deterrence” in intent |
| Bomber missions | 7 missions, 13 sorties | Fewer than in earlier years |
| Ocean surveillance and survey ships | 197 ship-days | Listed among the platforms whose activity is flagging |
| Island-related freedom of navigation operations | 2 | The same as 2024 and “far below the historical average”; neither was announced by the US at the time |
| Warship transits of the Taiwan Strait | 3 | Down every year: 12 in 2021, 9 in 2022, 6 in 2023, 5 in 2024 |
The reading
The report's headline finding is American weakness, not American menace. Its first chapter is titled “strategic platforms: growth is flagging”. Carriers, amphibious groups and bombers are described as worn down by the Middle East and the Caribbean and by the state of US shipbuilding; the report cites American figures showing carriers' time in the Central Command area rising from 8% of deployments in 2023 to 41% in 2024. A reader expecting a threat assessment finds something closer to an audit of an overstretched navy. T3
The presence is being kept up by cheaper means. What grew in 2025, on this count, was reconnaissance, exercises and work with allies. Drones now fly three sorties in ten, and aircraft based in the Philippines fly 38% of all reconnaissance over the sea. The report's own explanation for surges is revealing: flights rise when the PLA does something new, as when the carrier Fujian first left Sanya for training in November 2025. US activity is presented as reactive to China's. T3
“Autopilot” is the key word, and it cuts two ways. Hu Bo's preface says the South China Sea is “plainly not a priority” for the second Trump administration, yet forces on the front line keep operating as before. The conclusion draws the worrying inference: a military running without political attention may act “rougher and more provocative”, and could upset the restraint the two militaries have shown since the leaders' meeting of November 2023. The fear expressed is not of a plan but of the absence of one. T3
The legal objection is to reconnaissance, not to navigation. The preface does not say US ships may not sail the sea. It says thousands of close-in reconnaissance sorties and hundreds of targeted exercises a year near another country's coast breach the “peaceful uses of the seas”. That is a narrower and more defensible complaint than the official line about “navigational hegemony”, and it is the one Chinese analysts make when they write at length. T3 S49
It records something official media left out. Describing the USS Higgins operation of 13 August 2025, the report says it came “two days after the collision between a China Coast Guard vessel and a Chinese Navy vessel near Huangyan Dao”. The mainland news reports of that week read for this site's timeline mention only the expulsion of Philippine ships. A Beijing-based think tank states as plain fact an accident the official record passes over. T3 E71
On the Philippine bases the same team is sceptical of the alarm. Its July 2026 report notes that sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement rose from five to nine and that northern Luzon faces the Taiwan Strait. It then lists why the build-up has “fallen short of expectations”: the Philippines can contribute little in wartime, the bases need very large investment to be usable in war, and Philippine domestic politics make Washington hesitate. T28
How to read it. The report cites American and other foreign sources for most of its raw data and says it offers “a third-party view”. Its counts cannot be checked here, and the institute is Chinese. But its argument is not the one the Foreign Ministry makes. It says the United States is distracted, thinly spread and still dangerous precisely because nobody is steering.
The passages
Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.
Preface by Hu Bo, opening sentence
和平时期,一国在另一国的周边海域每年进行数千架次的抵近侦察和数百次的针对性演习等高强度的军事活动,无疑有违《联合国宪章》宗旨、和平共处原则和《联合国海洋法公约》中“和平利用海洋”等国际法原则和规则。
In peacetime, for one country to carry out high-intensity military activity in the waters around another every year — thousands of close-in reconnaissance sorties and hundreds of targeted exercises — is without doubt contrary to the purposes of the UN Charter, the principles of peaceful coexistence and rules of international law such as the “peaceful uses of the seas” in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Preface
特朗普政府二任以来,南海显然不是美国的重点关注议题,但西太一线美军处于“自动驾驶”状态,仍在不遗余力地强化在南海的军事存在及活动。
Since the Trump administration's second term began, the South China Sea has plainly not been a priority for the United States, but US forces on the western Pacific front line are on “autopilot” and are still sparing no effort to strengthen their presence and activity in the South China Sea.
Section 2, on air reconnaissance
部署在菲律宾的P-8A反潜巡逻机和MQ-9“死神”无人机保持着每天出动1-2架次的频次,前往黄岩岛及南沙方向进行侦察,全年约450架次,已占美军对南海总侦察架次的38%。
P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft and MQ-9 “Reaper” drones based in the Philippines kept up one or two sorties a day toward Huangyan Dao and the Nansha Islands, about 450 sorties over the year, which is now 38% of all US reconnaissance sorties over the South China Sea.
Section 3, on the USS Higgins, 13 August 2025
此次行动发生在中国海警与中国海军舰艇在黄岩岛附近海域相撞事故的两天后,是自2019年以来美国海军首次在黄岩岛附近海域开展“航行自由行动”。
This operation took place two days after the collision between a China Coast Guard vessel and a Chinese Navy vessel in waters near Huangyan Dao, and was the US Navy's first “freedom of navigation operation” near Huangyan Dao since 2019.
Section 6, conclusions
在“自动驾驶”的模式下,美军的动作可能会更加粗暴且更具挑衅性,这将给2023年11月旧金山峰会以来中美两军相对克制的互动样式带来变数
In “autopilot” mode, US forces' actions may become rougher and more provocative, which would unsettle the relatively restrained pattern of interaction between the two militaries since the San Francisco summit of November 2023.
SCSPI report on US bases in the Philippines, July 2026, preface
不过,EDCA基地的扩建并不及预期,美加强在菲军事存在仍受到诸多因素的制约
However, the expansion of the EDCA bases has fallen short of expectations, and the strengthening of the US military presence in the Philippines is still held back by many factors.