While the Foreign Ministry declines even to name Vietnam, a Beijing think tank has published satellite measurements of fourteen Vietnamese-held features, the dredgers used and who sold them. It is the most detailed Chinese account of another claimant's construction, and it never mentions China's own.
The figures
| Feature (Chinese name) | Common English name | Land area in May 2025 | What the study notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 柏礁 Bai Jiao | Barque Canada Reef | about 2.8 km² | Runway about 3,200 m taking shape; largest reef flat in the group |
| 毕生礁 Bisheng Jiao | Pearson Reef | about 1.27 km² | New harbour basin about 530 m by 410 m |
| 大现礁 Daxian Jiao | Discovery Great Reef | about 0.95 km² | Built out from three outposts since October 2022 |
| 鸿庥岛 Hongxiu Dao | Namyit Island | 0.83 km² | Was about 0.08 km²; harbour basin about 980 m by 400 m |
| 无乜礁 Wumie Jiao | Tennent Reef | about 0.69 km² | A strip 3,770 m long joins the two ends |
| 奈罗礁 Nailuo Jiao | South Reef | about 0.68 km² | Sandbar extended about 1,940 m north |
| 日积礁 Riji Jiao | Ladd Reef | about 0.6 km² | Sandbar about 2,430 m by 180 m |
| 敦谦沙洲 Dunqian Shazhou | Sand Cay | about 0.43 km² | Was about 0.09 km²; 6.3 nautical miles east of Taiping Island |
| 中礁 Zhong Jiao | Central Reef | about 0.3 km² | Harbour basin about 400 m by 380 m |
| 六门礁 Liumen Jiao | Alison Reef | about 0.1 km² | Work since December 2022 |
| 南华礁 Nanhua Jiao | Cornwallis South Reef | about 0.09 km² | New work at the northern outpost from December 2024 |
The reading
The scale claimed. The study says Vietnam holds 29 Nansha features, more than any other party, and that since October 2021 it has enlarged fourteen of them by more than ten square kilometres in total. The largest, Bai Jiao, has gone from outposts on a reef to 2.8 square kilometres with a runway about 3,200 metres long. Before 2021, the study says, Vietnam had one runway in the group, about 1,200 metres, on Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island). T24
It is written as engineering, not polemic. Apart from the standard adjectives “seized” and “illegally occupied”, the text is measurement: lengths of harbour basins, dates work began, areas before and after. It names the dredgers by model and the Dutch shipbuilder that delivered them, with delivery dates. For Vietnam's plans it cites a Philippine newspaper. The method is the one foreign institutes applied to China's construction a decade earlier, turned on a neighbour. T24
The contrast with the official voice is the point. Asked about this same construction in August 2025, the Foreign Ministry said only that China opposes building on “illegally occupied” features and did not name Vietnam. Joint statements with Hanoi that year and the next speak of managing differences. The think tank supplies the detail the ministry withholds, which lets Beijing put the facts on record without making a diplomatic protest. S38 E63 E12
What the study does not say. It nowhere compares Vietnam's ten square kilometres with China's own reclamation of 2013 to 2015, and it does not ask why Vietnam started when it did. Wu Shicun supplies part of the answer elsewhere: once China had finished its island building, he says, the other parties began to consider expanding the features they hold, and their appetite for a code of conduct that would have restrained such work declined. T24 T6
A military reading is asserted, with thin support. The study says the harbours and runways are meant to increase Vietnam's “military projection and rapid response” in the sea. The evidence offered for intent is the Philippine press report of 34 fortification projects. The measurements are the study's own; the purposes are inferred. T24
Why it matters for reading Beijing. The gap between what Chinese analysts publish about Vietnam and what Chinese officials say about Vietnam is the clearest sign that the quiet is a choice. The information exists, in Chinese, with coordinates. It is the Philippines, with far fewer features and far less construction, that receives the statements.
The passages
Chinese as published; the English is this site's rendering. Check the linked original before quoting.
Opening
越南侵占了29个地物,是所有南海当事方中占领南沙岛礁数量最多的,且自20世纪70年代以来,在相关岛礁上的填海造陆动作从未间断。
Vietnam has seized 29 features, the largest number of Nansha islands and reefs occupied by any party in the South China Sea, and since the 1970s its land reclamation on them has never stopped.
Section 1
截至2025年5月,越南在上述14个岛礁上已累计吹填超过10km²。
As of May 2025, Vietnam had reclaimed a cumulative total of more than 10 square kilometres on these fourteen features.
Section 1
此轮扩建,越南首次使用了绞吸式挖泥船。
In this round of expansion Vietnam has used cutter-suction dredgers for the first time.
On Bai Jiao (Barque Canada Reef)
截至2025年5月,跑道逐渐成形,长约3200m,柏礁的陆域总面积约为2.8km²。
As of May 2025 a runway about 3,200 metres long was taking shape, and the total land area of Bai Jiao was about 2.8 square kilometres.
Section 2
此番扩建的14个越占岛礁中,有8个岛礁(鸿庥岛、敦谦沙洲、毕生礁、无乜礁、柏礁、日积礁、奈罗礁、中礁)正在建造或已经建造出新的港池,可停靠大型船只。
Of the fourteen Vietnamese-occupied features being expanded, eight (Hongxiu Dao, Dunqian Shazhou, Bisheng Jiao, Wumie Jiao, Bai Jiao, Riji Jiao, Nailuo Jiao and Zhong Jiao) are building or have built new harbour basins able to berth large vessels.