South China Sea南海

Analysis

Beijing answers Washington's legal study, point by point

The Foreign Ministry paper of March 2022 replying to the US State Department's “Limits in the Seas” No. 150.

Against the tribunal Beijing argues only jurisdiction. Against the United States it argues the law itself: a non-party to the Convention cannot lecture parties, American practice breaks the rule it invokes, and warships may be required to ask permission.

The reading

This is the one official text that argues the merits. In replies to the tribunal Beijing says the case should never have been heard. Replying to a US government study that applied the award to China's claims, it engages the substance: historic rights, island groups as units, baselines, and warships in the territorial sea. The arguments that think tanks published at length in 2024 appear here first, in the ministry's own name, addressed to Washington. S17 T2

The first move is to deny American standing. The United States has not ratified the Convention and, the paper says, appoints itself its judge. The point is rhetorical but it frames everything after it: the argument is less that the US reading is wrong than that the US is not entitled to offer one. S17

The second is a charge of double standards with a named example. The paper cites Johnston Island, 0.18 square kilometres, from which it says the United States claims a 200-mile zone, and asks how that squares with the tribunal's test for an island. Wang Yi made the same argument orally in 2025 and it entered the formal 2026 statement as a rhetorical question. This 2022 paper is where it is first set down. S17 S44 S33

It confirms in writing what has not been done. “China has not yet drawn the territorial sea baselines of the Dongsha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands.” The sentence is offered as a rebuke to the American study for inventing them. It is also an official statement of the gap a Chinese jurist later called the reason China's jurisdiction around the Nansha Islands is legally uncertain. Since then Beijing has drawn baselines at Huangyan Dao, which it counts as part of Zhongsha, and nowhere else. S17 T15 S8

On warships it states the disagreement plainly. China's position is that requiring prior approval for foreign warships in the territorial sea is compatible with innocent passage and widely practised. It describes the US Freedom of Navigation Program as created in the late 1970s to defeat that rule. This is the legal core of every statement that a US destroyer “entered without approval”: the two governments read the same article in opposite ways and each acts on its reading. S17 S2

It objects to how Taiwan is listed. The paper protests that the US study placed Taiwan alongside sovereign states. In a text about the law of the sea the objection is a reminder that, for Beijing, the claim in the South China Sea is made for one China, and that Taipei's holdings are counted within it. S17

What it adds to the picture of Chinese views of America. The analysts read elsewhere on this site describe a distracted and overstretched power. The ministry's legal paper describes a hegemon that makes rules it does not accept for itself. The two are not in conflict, but they are aimed at different readers: one at Chinese planners, the other at third countries deciding whose reading of the law to follow.

The passages

Part 1

美国拒绝批准《公约》,却动辄以《公约》裁判官自居

The United States refuses to ratify the Convention, yet at every turn sets itself up as the Convention's judge.

Part 1

依据面积仅0.18平方公里、不能维持人类居住或其本身经济生活的约翰斯顿岛,主张200海里专属经济区。这是典型的“双重标准”。

…on the basis of Johnston Island, which has an area of only 0.18 square kilometres and cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own, it claims a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. This is a typical “double standard”.

Part 1

中国尚未划设东沙群岛、中沙群岛、南沙群岛的领海基线,《报告》杜撰上述群岛的基线

China has not yet drawn the territorial sea baselines of the Dongsha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands; the Report invents baselines for those island groups.

Part 1

沿海国要求外国军舰进入本国领海需事先通报或获得批准,不违反《公约》关于“无害通过”的规定,拥有广泛的国家实践。

A coastal state's requirement that foreign warships give prior notification or obtain approval before entering its territorial sea does not violate the Convention's provisions on “innocent passage”, and is supported by wide state practice.

Part 1

上世纪70年代末,美国抢在《公约》达成之前出台“航行自由计划”,目的是对抗《公约》关于“无害通过”的规定,维护美国海上霸权。

At the end of the 1970s the United States rushed out its “Freedom of Navigation Program” before the Convention was concluded, in order to counter the Convention's provisions on “innocent passage” and preserve American maritime hegemony.

Part 4

南海是地区国家的共同家园,不是域外势力谋求地缘政治私利的狩猎场。

The South China Sea is the common home of the countries of the region, not a hunting ground for outside forces seeking geopolitical gain.

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