South China Sea南海

Analysis

The “new narrative”: how a minister's phrase became a think-tank programme

A paper published six days after Wang Yi's remark of July 2025, and a coast guard concept of November 2026.

Chinese institutes are trying to change what the sea is talked about: from collisions to cooperation, and from a coast guard that expels to one that serves. The papers show the method, the figures used, and the condition attached.

The reading

From phrase to paper in six days. Wang Yi said in Kuala Lumpur on 12 July 2025 that the sea needed “a new narrative”. A paper developing the idea appeared on the Strategic Situation Probing Initiative's site on 18 July. The speed shows how the institutes work: a minister's phrase is given an argument, footnotes and a programme almost at once. T27 S52

The argument is that the old story is out of proportion. The paper says disputes are “a very small part” of regional relations, that managing them is the norm and friction “only occasional”, and that the dominant account is written by Western media. It is supported with traffic figures: about 500,000 merchant passages a year and about 40% of world goods trade through the sea and nearby straits, with disputed areas said not to touch the main shipping lanes. These are the paper's figures; it does not name their source in the passage quoted. T27

It turns the navigation argument around. The paper also gives a number rarely seen in official texts: more than 20,000 ship-days of warships and more than 30,000 military aircraft sorties a year by regional and outside states, plus hundreds of large exercises. The point made is that so much military activity proves navigation is free. The same numbers could be read as showing how crowded the sea has become. T27

The new story has an old precondition. When the paper turns to how the narrative is to change, its first step is to remove the arbitral award, called a “negative asset” under which “no change can move a single step”. The cooperative vocabulary is new; the demand beneath it is the one made since 2016. A narrative that begins by requiring the other side to drop its strongest legal card is unlikely to be heard as conciliation in Manila. T27 S33

The coast guard is being redescribed. In November 2026 a researcher at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies and an officer of the China Coast Guard jointly set out the coast guard's “three bodies” concept: a professional law-enforcement partnership, an inclusive security community, a sustainable governance complex. The force is presented as a provider of rescue, anti-poaching and environmental protection, serving the “blue economy”, and the text says security work should involve “no coercion” and should not target third parties. T49

Two pictures of one force. The same coast guard appears in this site's timeline using water cannon at Huangyan Dao and rehearsing forced towing. The concept paper mentions none of that, and the incident statements mention none of the cooperation. Both are true descriptions of what the force does. Which one neighbours believe will depend less on the papers than on the next resupply run. T49 E31 E29

What to take from it. The campaign is evidence that Beijing knows how the dispute looks abroad and wants to change the subject, not the position. It also supplies, in passing, the first trade-share figure found in the texts read for this site.

The passages

Wang Yi, 12 July 2025, as quoted

不要一提到南海就想到摩擦、冲突甚至对抗,而是应想到和平、稳定与合作,这应成为今后南海叙事的主流。

Do not, at every mention of the South China Sea, think of friction, conflict or even confrontation; think instead of peace, stability and cooperation. This should become the mainstream of the South China Sea narrative from now on.

Lei Xiaolu

可见,南海领土主权和海洋权益争端只是地区国家关系之中极小的一部分。

It can be seen that the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea are only a very small part of relations among the countries of the region.

Wang Yi's “shadow play” remark, as quoted

菲方每次海上行动,编写剧本的是域外势力,承包直播的是西方媒体,而戏码千篇一律,就是处心积虑抹黑中国。

For every Philippine action at sea, the script is written by outside forces and the live broadcast is contracted to Western media, and the plot is always the same: a calculated effort to smear China.

Lei Xiaolu

据统计,每年有近50余万艘次商船通过南海,全球货物贸易40%左右经过南海及其周边海峡

According to statistics, some 500,000 merchant ship passages cross the South China Sea each year, and about 40% of global goods trade passes through the South China Sea and its surrounding straits.

Lei Xiaolu, on the path to a new narrative

背负南海仲裁案的“负资产”,任何转变都寸步难行。

Carrying the “negative asset” of the South China Sea arbitration, no change can move a single step.

Cai Zhenwei and Fang Ming, November 2026

海上执法不是为了把海洋“管死”,而是要把海洋“盘活”。

Maritime law enforcement is not meant to “regulate the sea to death” but to “bring the sea to life”.

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