One undefined phrase holds the system together. The Coast Guard Law applies in “waters under China's jurisdiction”. So do the Maritime Traffic Safety Law and the Fisheries Law, and the Environment Code uses “other sea areas under China's jurisdiction”. None of them says where those waters are. The only definition in force is in the 1987 Implementing Rules of the Fisheries Law, and it is circular: sea areas that China has jurisdiction over under its laws, its treaties “or other relevant international law”. A Chinese jurist has pointed out that because the Coast Guard Law gives no extent, one must look to other statutes, which refer back to the same phrase. The reach of each law at a given reef is whatever the enforcing agency says it is. S5 S6 G1 G2 G18 T15
The statutes are layered so that any presence is an offence under several of them. A foreign fishing boat at Huangyan Dao is now inside declared baselines, inside a nature reserve that nobody may enter, subject to the Fisheries Law's expulsion and confiscation, and policed by a force whose own law allows forcible towing. Each instrument was adopted separately and for a stated domestic purpose. Together they leave no lawful way for such a boat to be there. S8 S30 G1 S5
Islands that carry base points are frozen by law. The Island Protection Law forbids works that alter the terrain within the protection area of a territorial sea base point, and makes uninhabited islands state property. The Huangyan Dao reserve rules give a ministry the task of protecting the base points there. Declaring baselines therefore also changes what may be built, and by whom. G5 S30
Chinese scholars have worked out how the Coast Guard Law would apply to the grounded ship. Gao Shengti and Zhang Ziting argue that the hulk at Ren'ai Jiao could be classed as a “fixed platform” or, since it has been reinforced from inside, as a structure on a reef, so that articles 17, 20 and 21 would permit its forced removal. No official statement read for this site says that. The argument shows the powers are understood to be available. G12 S5
Beijing and Taipei wrote similar laws in the same year. Both enacted exclusive economic zone statutes in 1998 with 200-mile zones, natural prolongation and delimitation by agreement on equitable principles. They differ on warships: Beijing requires approval, Taipei prior notice. Taipei's law provides for provisional arrangements pending delimitation, the idea Beijing offers as “shelving disputes”. Neither statute mentions the line on the 1947 map. S4 G11 S2 G10
What the statute book does not contain. There are no baselines for the Nansha Islands. Nothing defines “historic rights”, which rest on one sentence of the 1998 law. No law mentions the dashed line. And no published text sets the outer limit of “waters under China's jurisdiction”. The gaps are the same ones Chinese scholars list, and they have survived two rounds of legislation since 2021. S4 S17 T15
The line on the map is law only through map regulation. No statute defines the dashed line, but the Regulations on Map Management require every public map to pass official review and to show the national territory “correctly”, on pain of confiscation and fines. The line therefore appears on every lawful map in China, and it is the mapping authority, not the legislature, that decides how it is drawn. When the 2023 standard map was released, the announcement did not mention the line; asked three days later why it showed ten dashes where the map sent to the UN in 2009 showed nine, the Foreign Ministry spokesman did not explain the difference. G15 S23 S25
Administration is made by executive decision. Sansha City, its two districts and the Huangyan Dao reserve were each created by a State Council approval reported in a few lines, not by an act of the legislature. The district decision puts the seat of Nansha's government on Yongshu Jiao, a reef built up into an island. Jurisdiction in each case is over islands and reefs “and their waters”, another phrase without a stated limit. S19 S20 S26
Foreign fishing now has two layers of penalty. The ministry's interim provisions, last revised in January 2022, ban foreign fishing in internal waters and the territorial sea and allow fines up to 500,000 yuan. The rewritten Fisheries Law of 2025 sits above them with fines up to 2,000,000 yuan and confiscation of the vessel. The provisions state their basis in the old Fisheries Law; whether they have been revised again to match the new one was not confirmed for this page. G14 G1
Baselines convert sea into state property. The Law on the Use of Sea Areas makes internal waters and the territorial sea state-owned and requires a state-granted right for any lasting exclusive use. Where baselines have been declared, at Xisha and now Huangyan Dao, the water inside and twelve miles outside them falls under that regime. A declaration of baselines is also a declaration of ownership. G13 S3 S8
The promise of 1996 is still open. The first baseline declaration ended by saying the remaining baselines would be announced later. Two further declarations came in 2024, twenty-eight years on. The Foreign Ministry confirmed in 2022 that none had been drawn for Dongsha, Zhongsha or Nansha; since then only Huangyan Dao, which Beijing counts within Zhongsha, has been added. S3 S7 S8 S17
One statute admits there is a limit. The deep seabed law defines its subject as the seabed “beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China and of other states”. The law concerns mining in the international area, not the South China Sea, but it shows that Chinese legislation recognises an end to national jurisdiction in principle while never fixing where it lies in this sea. G16
Taipei's coast guard law uses a similar open clause. It defines the waters where the coast guard acts to include, after the named zones, “other waters over which the country may exercise jurisdiction” under law, treaty or international law. Beijing's only definition, in the 1987 fisheries rules, is built the same way. Neither side's law names a boundary. Its coast guard reported expelling two mainland government ships that entered Taiping's prohibited waters in June 2026. G17 G18 H40
The treaty came with four reservations of position. When the legislature ratified the Convention in 1996 it attached declarations, and each maps onto a present dispute: the 200-mile zone, delimitation by consultation on “the principle of equity” and not by a court, sovereignty over the island groups listed in 1992, and prior permission for warships. The exclusion of compulsory procedures for delimitation, added in 2006, completed a position already visible ten years earlier. G26 S15
Beijing has drawn one sea boundary, and only where no island was in dispute. The Beibu Gulf agreement with Vietnam took effect in 2004 after twenty-seven years of talks, with a fisheries agreement that Beijing insisted be signed and brought into force on the same day. The Foreign Ministry called it the country's first boundary at sea. No other has followed in the South China Sea, where every delimitation would first require agreement on who owns the islands. G25
Heritage law reaches further than any other. The underwater relics regulations claim ownership of Chinese-origin wrecks in waters under Chinese jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea, and define as protected relics those of Chinese origin lying in other states' zones and on the high seas. No other instrument on this page asserts an interest in objects lying in another state's zone. G19
Oil is state property wherever jurisdiction is asserted. The 1982 petroleum regulations, the oldest instrument on this page still doing daily work, declare the oil of the shelf and of “other sea areas under jurisdiction over marine resources” to belong to the state and allow the government to mark out blocks for foreign partners. They pre-date the Convention's entry into force and the 1998 zone law, and their wording has not been narrowed since. G20 S4
Cables are a quiet instrument of control. On the continental shelf international law gives other states the freedom to lay cables, subject to the coastal state's say over the route. The 1989 provisions use that margin fully: notification, then consent to the route. With the extent of the shelf claimed in the South China Sea undefined, the consent requirement has no stated outer edge either. G21
Taipei's exclusion zones rest on cross-strait law, not the law of the sea. The waters closed to mainland vessels around the islands Taipei holds, Taiping among them, are announced by the defence ministry under the act that governs relations with the mainland, which allows expulsion, detention and “necessary defensive measures”. The Ocean Basic Act of 2019 lists respect for history first among the principles of Taipei's ocean diplomacy, an echo of the historical claim both sides inherited. G24 G27 H40
The courts were given their instructions three weeks after the award. The Supreme People's Court adopted its two interpretations in December 2015 and May 2016 but published them on 1 August 2016, twenty days after the arbitral award Beijing rejected. The first opens by stating its purpose as safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. Its definition of the waters concerned lists the zones and then adds “other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China”, the same open category as everywhere else. G28 G29 S15
Coming back after being driven off is a crime. Under the second interpretation, a foreigner who illegally enters the territorial sea commits an offence with “serious circumstances” if they refuse to leave or return after expulsion. Where baselines have been declared, at Xisha and since 2024 at Huangyan Dao, there is a territorial sea for this rule to bite on. That connection is this site's reading; no prosecution of a foreign fisherman on this ground was found for this page. G29 S3 S8
Maritime rights are a defence task by statute. The National Security Law of 2015 authorises “all necessary” measures of defence and control to safeguard maritime rights and interests, and the National Defense Law as revised in 2020 gives the armed forces the same duty. Neither says where those rights lie. Read with the Coast Guard Law, they mean that both the military and the coast guard have a standing legal mandate that does not depend on any boundary being drawn. G32 G31 S5
Water can be closed as a military zone. The Military Installations Protection Law lets provincial governments and military commands, or for especially important sites the State Council and Central Military Commission, mark out restricted zones over water. Entry, low overflight, photography and surveying are then forbidden. This page did not look for any published zone around the garrisoned features of Nansha; the power exists whether or not one has been announced. G36
The giant clam was protected in 2016, twice. The second court interpretation defined the corals and giant clams whose taking is a crime, and four months later Hainan banned both the harvest and the trade throughout the province, which administers the island groups through Sansha. Harvest and trade were closed in law within the same half-year. G29 G30
The open phrase keeps spreading. The 2024 Mineral Resources Law applies in China's territory “and other sea areas under its jurisdiction”. That makes at least nine instruments on this page whose reach is fixed by the same undefined category: the coast guard, traffic safety, fisheries, environment, surveying and minerals statutes, the relics and petroleum regulations, and the court's interpretations. Each new law that adopts the phrase extends its own subject matter to wherever the others are enforced. G33 G28 G23 G19 G20
The 2002 Declaration is the text Beijing holds others to. It is not law, but two of its paragraphs do constant work in Chinese statements: disputes are for “the sovereign states directly concerned”, which excludes courts and outside powers, and no party should inhabit a feature that is uninhabited. The Foreign Ministry cites the second, by paragraph number, against the grounded ship at Ren'ai Jiao, and relied on the first in refusing the arbitration. The paragraph says nothing in terms about building on features a party already occupies. G37 E89 S13
A reserve at Huangyan Dao now excludes fishing and admits patrols, in the same article. Under the 2026 regulations human activity in a core protected zone is prohibited. The exceptions include management patrols and whatever state organs need to do to enforce the law. Fishing is not among them. Applied to the 1,242 hectares of core zone at Huangyan Dao, the rule makes any fisherman's presence unlawful and the coast guard's presence expressly lawful. The regulations do not mention Huangyan Dao; the application is this site's reading of the two texts together. G41 S30 S26
“Maritime rights and interests” has become a ground for creating a reserve. The 2026 text lists reserves “involving national maritime rights and interests” among those that must be national-level, beside those of scientific importance, and gives their boundary survey to central departments instead of the province. The text was issued five months after the Huangyan Dao reserve was approved. The earlier regulations were not read for this page, so whether the category is new was not confirmed. Nothing in it is limited to Huangyan Dao. G41 S26
Chinese fishing at Nansha and Huangyan Dao is licensed feature by feature. The permit rules put both waters in a special class with treaty zones, require the ground to be named on each permit, and reserve the licensing to the ministry or those it authorises. A Chinese boat fishing there holds a document from the state naming that water. This is the administrative basis of what Chinese sources call traditional fishing grounds, and it means the fleet's presence is a matter of record, not of private initiative. G39
The reporting rule depends on where the territorial sea is. The 2021 notice applies to listed foreign vessels entering the territorial sea, with position reports every two hours if the ship's identification system fails. In the South China Sea a territorial sea has been drawn only around Xisha and Huangyan Dao. Whether Beijing treats the notice as applying around Nansha features, which have no baselines, is not stated in the notice or in any text read for this page. G38 S6 S3 S8 S17
Criminal procedure reaches past the territorial sea. The coast guard's 2023 rules provide for cases where a foreigner commits a crime against the Chinese state in waters beyond the territorial sea and never enters China: the China Coast Guard itself designates which of its agencies takes the case. Together with the court's 2016 interpretations and the Criminal Law's closed-season offence, the chain from patrol to prosecution is complete on paper. G34 G42 G28 G29
Data are regulated as well as ships. The ocean observation regulations bring buoys and instruments under the same approval as research cruises and forbid passing secret observation data abroad. With the Surveying and Mapping Law and the 1996 research rules, three instruments now cover foreign measurement of the sea, each applying in “other sea areas under jurisdiction”. G40 G23 G6
The two coast guards are given force in opposite styles. Taipei's act lists weapons one by one and ties cannon to armed threat or named grave crimes, a finding that no other means remains, and a decision by the agency's head. Beijing's Coast Guard Law, in article 22, authorises “all necessary measures including the use of weapons” whenever sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction are being unlawfully infringed at sea by foreign organisations or individuals. One text is a checklist of conditions; the other is a mandate defined by the interest protected. G47 S5
A provincial rule repeats the national claim in its own name. Hainan's fisheries measures require central approval for foreign boats in “waters under this province's jurisdiction”. The requirement adds nothing to the national rules on foreign fishing, which already demand approval. What it adds is a provincial enforcement hook, and a second undefined extent, the province's, on top of the state's. G43 G14 G1
Protected species are state property at sea. The Wildlife Protection Law applies in “other sea areas under jurisdiction” and makes wildlife state-owned. With the court's interpretation and Hainan's clam ban, three levels of law now cover the same animals: a statute on ownership, a judicial rule on crime, and a provincial rule on trade. G44 G29 G30
Closing the sea for an exercise is an administrative act. Under the 1993 provisions a military no-sail zone takes effect for shipping through a warning issued by the maritime authority. The provisions apply in China's “coastal waters”; this page did not find a definition of that term in the text. G45
Names and base points are administered like territory. The 2020 notice fixes names for reefs and for features of the seabed, and the map regulations make those names compulsory on public maps. The 2012 measures require a protection zone around every base point; the report on them counts 77 points declared in 1996 for the mainland coast and Xisha. At Huangyan Dao the reserve's management measures give the natural resources ministry the “protection and management of territorial sea base points” among its tasks, so the reserve and the baseline are run together. S21 G15 G46 S30
Texts were read on the People's Daily, Xinhua, ministry and Taiwan Ministry of Justice sites; the National People's Congress law database could not be opened. The coast guard's 2024 procedure rules are described from a press report because the text itself would not load. Check the linked original before relying on any passage.